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Abstract. RSA–CRT is the most widely used implementation for RSA
signatures. However, deterministic and many probabilistic RSA signatures
based on CRT are vulnerable to fault attacks. Nevertheless, Coron and
Mandal (Asiacrypt 2009) show that the randomized PSS padding protects
RSA signatures against random faults. In contrast, Fouque et al. (CHES
2012) show that PSS padding does not protect against certain non-random
faults that can be injected in widely used implementations based on the
Montgomery modular multiplication.
In this paper, we prove the security of an infective countermeasure against
a large class of non-random faults; the proof extends Coron and Mandal’s
result to a strong model where the adversary can choose the value of the
faulty signatures modulo one of the prime factors of the RSA modulus.
This fault model is clearly strictly more general than Coron and Mandal’s,
and it captures most of the non-random faults of Fouque et al. Such
non-random faults induce, together with the infective countermeasure,
more complex probability distributions than in the original proof; we
analyze them using careful estimates of character sums over finite fields.
The security proof is formally verified using appropriate extensions of
EasyCrypt, and provides the first application of formal verification to
provable (i.e. reductionist) security in the context of fault attacks.
Keywords: Fault Attacks, PSS, RSA–CRT, Infective countermeasure,
Formal Verification, EasyCrypt
1 Introduction
Signature schemes are among the most widely used constructions in cryptography.
Although there is much interest in signature schemes based on elliptic curves,
RSA signatures are still widely used. Moreover, many implementations of RSA,
including OpenSSL and implementations for embedded devices such as smartcards,
use the well-known Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) technique for computing
modular exponentiations more efficiently: exponentiations using the CRT can
be expected to be 4 times faster than those using full-size exponents. However,
when unprotected, RSA–CRT is vulnerable to the so-called Bellcore attack,
first introduced by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [7], and later refined [3,28]. An
adversary who knows the padded message and can inject a fault in one of the half
exponentiations can efficiently factor the public modulus using a single faulty
signature and a GCD computation.
Many countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate this vulnerability,
including extra computations and sanity checks of intermediate and final re-
sults (see [24]). The simplest such protection is to verify the signature before
releasing it. This is reasonably cheap since the public exponent e is usually
small. Another approach is to use an extended modulus, as in Shamir’s trick [25]
and its later refinements which also protect CRT recombination using Garner’s
formula [6,11,27,12]. Finally, redundant exponentiation algorithms [18,24] such
as the Montgomery Ladder can be used. Regardless of the approach, RSA–CRT
fault countermeasures tend to be rather costly: for example, Rivain’s coun-
termeasure [24,19] has a stated overhead of 10% compared to an unprotected
implementation, and is purportedly more efficient than previous works [18,27,19].
Boneh et al.’s original fault attack does not apply to RSA signatures with
probabilistic encoding functions, but some extensions of it were proposed to
attack randomized ad-hoc padding schemes such as ISO 9796-2 and EMV [13,16].
At Asiacrypt 2009, Coron and Mandal [14] paved the way of provable security
against side-channel attack in a practical setting by proving that RSA–PSS is
secure against random faults in the random oracle model. Injecting a fault on the
half-exponentiation modulo the second factor q of N produces a result that can be
modeled as uniformly distributed modulo q, and the result of such a fault cannot
be used to break RSA–PSS signatures. It is tempting to conclude that using RSA–
PSS should enable signers to dispense with costly RSA–CRT countermeasures.
However, Fouque et al. [17] show that it is possible to break RSA–PSS using
certain non-random faults if the result is not checked. Indeed, they obtain a key
recovery attack with a few faulty signatures on CRT implementations of RSA–PSS
that use the state-of-the-art modular multiplication algorithm of Montgomery [21].
Thus, even with PSS, it remains important to check the signature before releasing
it.
Infective countermeasures. Checking results before release is a simple and
practical security measure, but it is not sufficient by itself, since simple tests
can be easily bypassed by flipping the outcome of a comparison [2,26]. Infective
countermeasures are an alternate approach in which results are released all the
time, but become gibberish when faulty computations occur: a fault (usually not
controlled by the adversary) results in a random value, which consequently makes
the faulty signature random. From a security point of view, since faults may not
be random, we may not be able to prove that the faulty output is fully random.
However, one may ask that the output be independent of secret information even
in the presence of non-random faults. Infective countermeasures have been used
before by Canetti and Goldwasser [9] to deal with fault-injecting adversaries
when decrypting ciphertexts in a distributed manner. One such countermeasure
for RSA–CRT was proposed by Boscher, Handschuh and Trichina [8]. In their
technique, the signer computes the signature S and recomputes y′ = Se mod N
to check the signature against the padded message y, before returning S + y′p −
(y mod p)+y′q−(y mod q) if y′ = y, and an error otherwise. Even if the adversary
bypasses the verification y′ = y, the output signature mixes the fault and correct
signature in a non-trivial way. Still, this countermeasure was later attacked by
Trichina and Korkikyan [26] for deterministic padding schemes. We tackle the
problem of masking faulty signatures so as to prevent the exploitation of faults
and protect validity checks.
Our contributions. In this paper we generalize the fault model from [15]
and consider a very powerful adversary able to inject non-random faults. More
precisely, we let the adversary set the value modulo q of the computed signatures
to an arbitrary value of his choice. Clearly, since he could choose that value
randomly, the model is strictly more powerful than the one considered by Coron
and Mandal. In addition, it captures many other types of faults, such as the “null
faults” and “constant faults” introduced by Fouque et al. [17]. If such a signatures
is directly returned to the adversary, he can clearly factor the modulus, but we
consider a simple countermeasure to avoid that problem. The countermeasure,
described in Fig. 1, uses infective techniques, mixing additional randomness
into faulty signatures in a provably secure way. In practice, we show that our
random infection masks faulty signatures enough for us to prove the security
of RSA–PSS under the RSA assumption in the random oracle model if enough
additional randomness is provided. Concretely, we sample a random value r′ and
add r′ · (y − y′) to the signature mod N , where y is the original padded message
and y′ is the padded message recovered from the signature. When the signature
is computed correctly, (y − y′) is zero and the correct signature is returned. If
the signature is faulty, we show that the masked output is statistically close to
uniform and hence leaks no secret information. We prove such results in two key
lemmas corresponding to [14, Lemmas 1, 2]. Since our faults are non-random, the
probability distributions are more complex; we use careful estimates of exponential
sums attached to corresponding rational functions to establish their regularity.
We only analyze this countermeasure when the validity check is performed in the
standard way (by computing the public permutation), but our random infection
might also be used to protect other checks such as Rivain’s [24,19]. A discussion
of the faults we model can be found in Section 2.
The second contribution of the paper is a formal proof of security of the
countermeasure using EasyCrypt5, a computer-aided framework that has previ-
ously been used to reason about the security of cryptographic constructions—but
was never applied to fault attacks and countermeasures. Our proof is the first
application of formal verification to provable security against fault attacks, as
other works [10,22,23] applying formal verification to fault attacks are focused
on proving the correctness of the countermeasures (that is, that the protected
5 https://www.easycrypt.info
Figure 1 Protected signing algorithm
1: function Sign(sk, pk,m) ⊲ sk = (dp , dq , αp , αq ,N ), pk = (e,N )
2: r ← {0, 1}k0 ⊲ Start of PSS padding
3: ω ← H (m, r)
4: st← G(ω)⊕ (r || 0kg−k0)
5: y ← os2ip(0 ||ω || st)
6: σp ← y
dp mod p ⊲ Signature computation
7: σq ← y
dq mod q
8: σ ← (αp · σp + αq · σq) mod N ⊲ αp = q · (q
−1 mod p) and similarly for αq
9: y′ ← σe mod N
10: r′ ← {0, 1}ρ\{0} ⊲ Infective countermeasure
11: σ′ ← σ + r′ · (y − y′) mod N
12: return i2osp(σ′)
program either returns the same result as the original program, or fails), but
do not provide any provable security guarantees. Apart from increasing our
confidence in the effectiveness of the countermeasure, our formal proof reveals a
glitch in the proof of Coron and Mandal [14], and also paves the way for formally
verifying the effectiveness of the countermeasures on standard implementations
of PKCS probabilistic signing, in the same way that [1] uses an older prototype
of EasyCrypt [5] to prove security of an implementation of PKCS encryption.
Related work. Christofi et al. [10] use a combination of program transformation
and verification techniques for proving Vigilant’s countermeasure for CRT-RSA.
They take a source program p and output a program pˆ that contains all possible
faulty behaviors of p. Then, they show that the program pˆ either returns a value
that matches the value returned by p on the same input, or else returns an error,
they conclude that the program is correct for all faults. While it is a natural
guarantee to seek, their theorem does not constitute a proof of security in the
sense of provable security, but rather a heuristic to validate a countermeasure
implementation.
Rauzy and Guilley [23] develop symbolic methods to analyze fault attacks
against RSA–CRT implementations. They model arithmetic computations as
algebraic expressions, and define a simplification procedure for expressions. Given
an expression e (representing the algorithm to be attacked), their tool tests for all
possible faulty variants eˆ of e if the expression gcd(N, e− eˆ) simplifies to a prime
factor of the RSA modulus. If some expression eˆ is found, then the algorithm is
considered insecure. Their tool is useful to find fault attacks on an algorithm,
but only provides guarantees of security against a restricted class of attackers.
Moreover, it is specialized to deterministic signature schemes and cannot deal
with randomized paddings like PSS.
Moro et al. [22] focus on the specific class of instruction skip attacks, in
which an adversary forces to skip the execution of a targeted instruction. To
protect against skip attacks, they transform a program p into a fault-tolerant
program pˆ, by providing for each instruction a possible replacement for execution
in the presence of instruction skip faults. Using a model checker, they establish
the equivalence between executing the instruction without faults and executing
the replacement sequence of instructions with instruction skip faults. Their
approach is general, and significantly improves resistance against instruction skip
attacks. However, it is not suitable for obtaining the strong guarantees required
by provable security.
2 Our results
Instead of considering the many possible faults an adversary could inject in Fig. 1,
we give the adversary access to two distinct oracles (Fig. 2) that compute valid
signatures (oracle S) and generalize faulty signatures (oracle F ), as justified in
Section 2. As discussed, our fault model is independent of the algorithm used to
compute modular exponentiation. We therefore use simpler definitions for public
and secret key, where a public key pk is composed of a public exponent e and
a modulus N , and a secret key sk is composed of a private exponent d and a
modulus N .
Throughout the security proof, we consider a fixed k that serves as the size
of the modulus and signatures. In particular, we assume that the modulus is
balanced, that is N = p ·q is such that 2k−1 ≤ N < 2k and 2k/2−1 ≤ p < q < 2k/2.
We also assume that public exponents produced by the key generation algorithm
are upper bounded by some constant emax much smaller than 2
k (in practice,
216 + 1 is often used). PSS padding is computed using two hash functions H ,
outputting bitstrings of length kh, and G , producing bitstrings of length kg, where
kh + kg + 1 = k. In addition, the padding scheme uses a random salt of length
k0 < kg. For simplicity, we model H as a function from {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k0 to
Figure 2 Oracles in our fault model
1: oracle S(m)
2: r ← {0, 1}k0
3: ω ← H (m, r)
4: st ← G(ω)⊕ (r || 0kg−k0)
5: y ← os2ip(0 ||ω || st)
6: σ ← yd mod N
7: return i2osp(σ)
1: oracle V (m, σ)
2: r ← ⊥
3: s ← os2ip(σ)
4: if 0 < s < N then
5: y ← se mod N
6: b ||ω || st← i2osp(y)
7: r || γ ← st⊕ G(ω)
8: ω′ ← H (m, r)
9: r = b = 0∧ω = ω′∧γ = 0kg−k0
10: return r
1: oracle F (m, a)
2: r ← {0, 1}k0
3: ω ← H (m, r)
4: st ← G(ω)⊕ (r || 0kg−k0)
5: y ← os2ip(0 ||ω || st)
6: σ ← yd mod N
7: r′ ← {0, 1}ρ\{0}
8: σ′ ← yd ·αp +(a+ r
′ · (y−ae)) ·αq
9: return i2osp(σ′)
{0, 1}kh , and G as a function from {0, 1}kh to {0, 1}kg . This is done without loss
of generality. In algorithm and game descriptions, we denote with i2osp and os2ip
the conversions between integers and their binary representations. For simplicity,
i2osp always produces a bitstring of length k.
We reduce the UF -CMA security of the faulty signature scheme presented in
Fig. 2, when the adversary is given access to the faulty signature oracle along
with the valid signature oracle and the random oracles H and G , to the one-way
security of RSA. We consider a forgery valid even if it was produced by the
faulty signature oracle. In the rest of this paper, we use S to denote the valid
signature oracle, F to denote the faulty signature oracle, K to denote the RSA
key generation algorithm, and V for the PSS verification algorithm. Subscripts
identify the game in which a particular oracle appears. We denote with Q X the
set of query-response pairs for queries made to oracle X so far.
Figure 3 Initial and Final Games
1: game UF -CMA
2: (e, d ,N )← K ()
3: (m, s)← AS,F ,H ,G(e,N )
4: b ← V (m, s)
5: win ← b ∧ (m, s) /∈ Q S
6: return win
1: game OW -RSA
2: (e, d ,N )← K ()
3: x∗ ← [0..N )
4: y∗ ← x∗e mod N
5: x ← I(e,N , y∗)
6: return x = x∗
Theorem 1 (UF -CMA security of protected PSS in the presence of
faults). Given a CMA adversary A against the faulty signature scheme (K , S ,F ,V )
that makes at most qH queries to H , qG queries to G, qS queries to S and qF
queries to F , we build a one-way inverter I such that
Pr[UF -CMA : win] ≤ Pr[OW -RSA : x = x∗] + ǫ0
with
ǫ0 =
(qH + qS + qF ) · (qH + qG + qS + qF ) + qG · qF · 3 + 1
2kh
+
(qS + qF ) · (2 · qH + qS + qF ) + qH + qS
2k0
+
1
2
k
2
−1
+ qF · (4e
2
max + 1) · k2
2ρ−k/2
Remark 1. This theorem allows us to conclude directly with a security claim for
PSS when emax is reasonably small (typically 2
16 + 1), ρ ≥ k/2 + 200, and the
modulus is not too large (see Remark 2).
Fault model justification. In this section, we justify our fault model, described
by oracle F (m, a) in Fig. 2. Our faulty signature oracle computes the correct
padded message y, samples r′ and returns σ′ = yd ·αp+ (a+ r′(y− ae)) ·αq with
a ∈ Z/qZ chosen by the adversary.
We allow multiple faults to be injected, but only during the RSA–CRT
computation (lines 6-7 of the protected signing Fig. 1). More precisely, we
consider a scenario where the computation modulo p is correct whereas those
modulo q is faulted to result in a constant a chosen by the adversary, i.e.
σf = (y
d mod p, a mod q) ∈ Z/pZ× Z/qZ. Then, using our countermeasure we
obtain:
σ′ =σf + r
′(y − σef )
=ydαp + αqa+ r
′(y − (ydαp + αqa)e)
=ydαp + (a+ r
′(y − ae))αq.
Our fault model leverages the results of Coron and Mandal in [14] who
treated the case of random faults against PSS scheme, and those of Fouque
et al. [17] who proposed various faults: the Null faults (forcing a small register
to 0), the Constant faults (forcing a small register to a constant) and the Zero
High-Order Bits faults (forcing part of a small register to 0). When applied during
the RSA–CRT computations to a precise small register, these faults may allow
the adversary to factor the RSA modulus. They apply to any padding scheme,
including randomized padding schemes such as PSS.
With our formalization, we take into account the Null faults model, which
results in nullifying the signature modulo q, by considering a = 0. Moreover,
we cover a more powerful model than the random faults one by giving to the
adversary the choice of the value a.
3 Statistical Lemmas
We need several results on the regularity of the probability distributions related
to the infective countermeasure. Recall that the statistical distance between a
random variable X on a finite set S and the uniform distribution is defined as:
∆1(X) =
1
2
·
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣Pr[X = s]− 1|S|
∣∣∣.
We say that X is δ-statistically close to uniform when ∆1(X) ≤ δ.
Our proofs rely on character sums over Z/qZ. We refer to [20] or the full
version of this paper [4] for basic properties of Dirichlet characters and character
sums. The main statistical result can be stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Consider integer intervals X = [1, X], W = [w0, w0 +W ) whose
lengths X,W satisfy X,W < q, and for all t ∈ Z/qZ, denote by T (X ,W; t) =
XW
q ·
(
1+V (X ,W ; t)) the number of solutions (x,w) ∈ X ×W of the congruence
xw ≡ t (mod q). Assuming that the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis holds, then
for all δ > 0, there exists a constant κδ > 0 depending only on δ (and not
q,X ,W) such that: ∑
t∈Z/qZ
∣∣V (X ,W; t)∣∣ ≤ κδq3/2+δ√
XW
.
In particular, the distribution of the products xw mod q is statistically close to
uniform in Z/qZ whenever XW ≫ q1+3δ.
Proof. Note first that all elements of X are invertible modulo q, whereas at most
one element of W is divisible by q. Denote by W ∗ the number of elements of W
which are invertible modulo q, which is thus equal to W or W − 1. We then have:
T (X ,W; 0) = X · (W −W ∗) ≤ X and hence ∣∣V (X ,W; 0)∣∣ ≤ q
W
.
On the other hand, for t 6= 0, we can express T (X ,W; t) as a sum over the
multiplicative characters modulo q. Indeed, the orthogonality of characters ensures
that, for all x,w, we have
∑
χ χ(xw)χ(t) = q − 1 if xw ≡ t (mod q) and 0
otherwise. Hence:
T (X ,W; t) = 1
q − 1
∑
χ
∑
(x,w)∈X×W
χ(xw)χ(t)
=
XW ∗
q − 1 +
1
q − 1
∑
χ 6=χ0
∑
(x,w)∈X×W
χ(xw)χ(t),
by putting aside the contribution of the trivial character χ0. Write that equality
as T (X ,W; t) = XW∗q−1 ·
(
1 + V ∗(t)
)
. We then have:
V ∗(t) =
1
XW ∗
∑
χ 6=χ0
∑
(x,w)∈X×W
χ(xw)χ(t),
and we can express the sum of the squared deviations
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣2 as:
∑
t 6=0
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣2 = 1
(XW ∗)2
∑
χ,χ′ 6=χ0
∑
x,w,x′,w′
χ(xw)χ′(x′w′)
∑
t 6=0
(χχ′)(t).
The sum over t on the right-hand side is equal to q − 1 if χ = χ′ and vanishes
otherwise, so that:∑
t 6=0
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣2 = q − 1
(XW ∗)2
∑
χ 6=χ0
∑
x,w,x′,w′
χ(xw)χ′(xw) =
q − 1
(XW ∗)2
∑
χ 6=χ0
∣∣S(χ)∣∣2,
where S(χ) =
∑
x∈X χ(x)
∑
w∈W χ(w). Now since X is an interval of the form
[1, X], it is classical that GRH implies, for any δ > 0,
∣∣∑
x∈X χ(x)
∣∣ ≤ cδX1/2qδ
for some constant cδ > 0 (see e.g. [20, Eq. (13.2)]). Hence:
∑
t 6=0
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣2 ≤ q − 1
(XW ∗)2
· c2δXq2δ ·
∑
χ
∑
(w,w′)∈W2
χ(w)χ(w′) ≤ c
2
δq
2δ(q − 1)2
XW ∗
by using orthogonality again. Then, the Cauchy–Schwarz inequlity yields:
∑
t 6=0
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣ ≤
√
c2δq
2+2δ
XW ∗
·
√
q − 1 ≤ cδq
δ(q − 1)3/2√
XW
.
Finally, observe that for t 6= 0, we have:
V (X ,W; t) = q
XW
T (X ,W; t)− 1 = q
XW
· XW
∗
q − 1 ·
(
1 + V ∗(t)
)− 1
=
qW ∗
(q − 1)W V
∗(t)− W − q(W −W
∗)
(q − 1)W .
On the last line, the first term is bounded in absolute value by qq−1
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣, and
the second term by qq−1W . As a result, we get:
∑
t∈Z/qZ
∣∣V (X ,W; t)∣∣ ≤ q
q − 1
∑
t 6=0
∣∣V ∗(t)∣∣+ q
W
+
∣∣V (0)∣∣ ≤ cδq3/2+δ√
XW
+
2q
W
which yields the stated result for κδ = cδ + 2, say (as a coarse upper bound). ⊓⊔
We now discuss our key statistical lemmas. The first one ensures that the
faulty signature σ′ = yd · αp +
(
a+ r′(y − ae)) · αq is indistinguishable from a
uniform random element in Z/NZ if the nonce r′ is large enough. We write x
instead of r′ in the rest of this section.
Lemma 2. Let N = pq be a k-bit balanced RSA modulus and e the public
exponent, 0 ≤ y < 2k−1 a random integer and x a random nonzero ρ-bit integer.
Fix an arbitrary integer a. Assuming that the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis
holds, the statistical distance between the distribution of σ′ = yd ·αp +
(
a+ x(y−
ae)
) · αq mod N and the uniform distribution modulo N is bounded as:
∆1(σ
′) ≤ κδqδ
√
N
XY
≤ 2kδ · 2(kδ−ρ)/2
for any δ > 0, with κδ as in Lemma 1.
Proof. The statistical distance between the distribution of σ′ and the uniform
distribution can be written as:
∆1(σ
′) =
1
2
∑
(s,t)∈Z/pZ×Z/qZ
∣∣∣∣∣ Pr(x,y)∈X×Y
[
σ′ ≡ s (mod p)
σ′ ≡ t (mod q)
]
− 1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
where X and Y are the integer intervals [1, X] and [0, Y ) with X = 2ρ − 1 and
Y = 2k−1 respectively. Let us estimate the probability
P (s, t) = Pr
(x,y)∈X×Y
[
σ′ ≡ s (mod p)
σ′ ≡ t (mod q)
]
appearing in that equation for some fixed (s, t) ∈ Z/pZ× Z/qZ.
We have σ′ ≡ s (mod p) if and only if yd ≡ s mod p, i.e. y ≡ se mod p.
Hence, the solutions of the first congruence are of the form y = (se mod p) + pw
for w in the integer interval [0,Ws), Ws = ⌈Y−(s
e mod p)
p ⌉. Then, the second
equation, which is equivalent to a + x(y − ae) ≡ t (mod q), becomes x(pw +
(se mod p)−ae) ≡ t−a (mod q). This can be written in the form x(w+w0) = t0
(mod q), with w0 =
(se mod p)−ae
p mod q and t0 =
t−a
p mod q. The number of
solutions (x,w) is thus T (X ,Ws; t0), with Ws = [w0, w0 +Ws). Hence:
P (s, t) =
1
XY
T
(X ,Ws; t0) = Ws
qY
+
Ws
qY
V
(X ,Ws; t0).
Note that Ws depends only on s (not on t), and that t 7→ t0 is a permutation of
Z/qZ. Thus, for fixed s, we can sum the previous equation over t ∈ Z/qZ, which
gives: ∑
t∈Z/qZ
∣∣∣∣P (s, t)− 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ q ·
∣∣∣Ws
qY
− 1
N
∣∣∣+ Ws
qY
∑
t∈Z/qZ
∣∣V (X ,Ws; t)∣∣.
Now Y/p− 1 ≤ Ws ≤ Y/p+ 1, so that the first term on the right-hand side is
bounded by 1/Y . Thus, Lemma 1 yields:
∑
t∈Z/qZ
∣∣∣∣P (s, t)− 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1Y + WsqY · κδq
3/2+δ
√
XWs
=
κδq
1/2+δ√
XY · p/2
using the coarse upper bound Ws/Y ≤ 2/p. Summing further over s, we finally
obtain: ∑
s,t
∣∣∣∣P (s, t)− 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ pY + κδqδ
√
2N
XY
and hence the desired result, since p ≤ √N and Y > X. ⊓⊔
Remark 2. Concretely, this result means that, for large enough N , it suffices to
take ρ slightly larger than m to obtain a statistical distance of 2−m.
If we do not want to rely on the Riemann Hypothesis, we can obtain an uncon-
ditional bound by replacing the use of GRH in Lemma 1 by the Po´lya–Vinogradov
inequality (or the Burgess bound). However, statistical indistinguishability from
uniform then requires somewhat larger values of ρ: at least k/4 +m+ o(1) with
Po´lya–Vinogradov or k/8 +m+ o(1) with the Burgess bound.
The security proof requires another statistical lemma which ensures that the
adversary has a negligible probability of querying the correct value ω ← H (M, r)
given a faulty signature. The proof, which uses Lemma 1 in a very similar way
as the proof of Lemma 2 (simply replacing the interval Y by a subinterval Yω),
is given in the full version of this paper [4].
Lemma 3. Let N, e, a, δ, κδ be as in Lemma 2. Assume that ρ ≥ kh + δk +
log2(4κδ). For any choice of σ
′ ∈ Z/NZ and any kh-bit value ω′, the probability
that a solution (x, y) ∈ [1, 2ρ)× [0, 2k−1) of the equation σ′ ≡ yd ·αp+
(
a+x(y−
ae)
) · αq (mod N) satisfies that the most significant kh bits ω ∈ [0, 2kh) of y
coincides with ω′ is bounded as:
Pr
[
ω = ω′|σ′] ≤ 3
2kh
.
Remark 3. Concretely, this result means that we have to choose ρ larger than
kh/2.
4 Security proof
The sequence of games presented in this Section and formal justifications for
all transitions between games are formalized in EasyCrypt. However, Lemmas 2
and 3 are stated as axioms of the formalization. Formally proving these lemmas
is outside the scope of this work, as it would first require to formalize at least
those properties of additive characters used in our proof.
The hash functions G and H are modelled as random oracles. For clarity, we
display the initial definition of H on the left in Fig. 4. The initial definition of G is
similar. We assume two global maps h and g are used to build the random oracles.
Our proof works mostly by transforming the random oracle H . We therefore
display the code for H for each transition, only displaying other oracles when
they suffer non-trivial changes.
Game 0. We initially transform both random oracles to keep track of the first
caller to make a particular query. It can be either the adversary (Adv), the
signature oracle (Sig), or the faulty signature oracle (FSig). Calls made by the
experiment when checking the validity of the forgery do not need to tag their
query as they are the last queries made to the random oracles and do not need
to update its state. We also extend the internal state of H with an additional
field for use later in the proof, and currently set to a default value ⊥.
Figure 4 Initial transition: extending state
1: oracle H (m, r)
2: if (m, r) /∈ dom(h) then
3: h[m, r ]← {0, 1}kh
4: return h[m, r]
1: oracle H0 (m, r)
2: if (m, r) /∈ dom(h) then
3: ω ← {0, 1}kh
4: h[m, r ]← (ω, c,⊥)
5: return π1(h[m, r])
Pr[UF -CMAA,K ,S,F ,V : win] = Pr[Game0 : win]
Games 1 and 2. In Game 1, we anticipate a call to G on the output of H every
time H is called. When H is called by either one of the signing oracles, we return
the result of that call to G as well as the result of the current H query, allowing
broad simplifications to the signing oracles. In Game 2, we deal with collisions on
r and ω values in the signing oracles. In later steps of the proof, we will need the
control-flow of the faulty signature oracle to be completely independent from both
r and ω, and we modify the oracle to allow these later transformations. Fresh
Figure 5 Games 1 and 2: anticipating calls to G and removing signing collisions
1: oracle H1(c,m, r)
2: if (m, r) /∈ dom(h) then
3: ω ← {0, 1}kh
4: h[m, r ]← (ω, c,⊥)
5: st ← G(c, ω)
6: else
7: ω ← π1(h[m, r ])
8: if c = Adv then
9: st ← ⊥
10: else
11: st ← G(c, ω)
12: return (ω, st)
1: oracle H2(c,m, r)
2: if
(m, r) /∈ dom(h) ∨ c = FSig ∨
(c = Sig ∧ π2(h[m, r ]) = FSig)
then
3: ω ← {0, 1}kh
4: st ← {0, 1}kg
5: if c 6= FSig ∨ (m, r) /∈ dom(h)
then
6: h[m, r ]← (ω, c,⊥)
7: if c 6= FSig ∨ ω /∈ dom(g) then
8: g [ω]← (st⊕ (r || 0kg−k0), c)
9: else
10: ω ← π1(h[m, r ])
11: if c = Adv then
12: st ← ⊥
13: else
14: (ω, st)← ⊥
15: return (ω, st)
Pr[Game0 : win] ≤ Pr[Game2 : win] + (qH + qS + qF ) ·
(
qS + qF
2k0
+
qG + qH + qS + qF
2kh
)
queries are treated normally. Non-fresh queries made by the signing oracles are
resampled as fresh if the previous query had been made by the faulty signature
oracle. Non-fresh queries made by the faulty signature oracle are resampled, but
not stored into the state. Game 1 is perfectly indistinguishable from Game 0, and
Game 2 can be distinguished from Game 1 if either i. (lines 2, 5 and 6) the fresh
r used in H -queries made by the signing oracles collides with a previously used r
(with probability at most (qS +qF )·(qH +qS +qF )·2−k0); ii. (lines 4, 7 and 8) or the
fresh ω used in G-queries made by the signing oracles collides with a previously
used ω (with probability at most (qH + qS + qF ) · (qG + qH + qS + qF ) · 2−kh). Note
that the value stored in g [ω] at line 8 in H2 is uniformly distributed since st is.
Game 3. Given that H now samples both bitstrings that compose the final
padded message, we compute the entire signature in H when called by either
one of the signing oracles. We transform the experiment to sample an integer x∗
and compute y∗ = x∗e mod N to serve as one-way challenge. We embed it in the
state when replying to H queries made by the adversary. Everything up to this
point has been set up so that the signing oracles can simply use π3(h[m, r ]) as
the padded message for m with salt r . Game 3 includes this simplification. We
introduce additional notation for clarity in the rest of the proof. Consider the
function:
f(e,N ),y∗,c : σ 7→

y
∗ · σe mod N if c = Adv
σe mod N otherwise
For a set X ⊆ Z/NZ, we denote by pim(e,N ),y∗,c(X) the uniform distribution on
the set S =
{
σ ∈ Z/NZ | f(e,N ),y∗,c(σ) ∈ X
}
.
Figure 6 Games 3 and 4: Embedding one-way challenge and oracle queries in F
1: oracle H3(c,m, r)
2: if
(m, r) /∈ dom(h) ∨ c = FSig ∨
(c = Sig ∧ π2(h[m, r ]) = FSig)
then
3: σ ← pim(e,N ),y∗,c
([
0..2k−1
))
4: y ← f(e,N ),y∗,c(σ)
5: b ||ω || st ← i2osp(y)
6: if c 6= FSig ∨ (m, r) /∈ dom(h)
then
7: h[m, r ]← (ω, c, σ)
8: if c 6= FSig ∨ ω /∈ dom(g) then
9: g [ω]← (st⊕ (r || 0kg−k0), c)
10: else
11: ω ← π1(h[m, r ])
12: if c = Adv then
13: st ← ⊥
14: else
15: (ω, st)← ⊥
16: return (ω, st)
1: oracle H4(c,m, r)
2: if (m, r) /∈ dom(h)∨c = FSig then
3: σ ← pim(e,N ),y∗,c
([
0..2k−1
))
4: y ← f(e,N ),y∗,c(σ)
5: b ||ω || st ← i2osp(y)
6: if c 6= FSig then
7: h[m, r ]← (ω, c, σ)
8: g [ω]← (st⊕ (r || 0kg−k0), c)
9: else
10: ω ← π1(h[m, r ])
11: if c = Adv then
12: st ← ⊥
13: else
14: (ω, st)← ⊥
15: return (ω, st)
Pr[Game2 : win] ≤ Pr[Game3 : win] + 2−
k
2
+2
Pr[Game3 : win] ≤ Pr[Game4 : win]
+ qH ·qS
2k0
+
qG ·qF ·3
2kh
Game 3 is indistinguishable from Game 2 exactly when x∗ is invertible.
Therefore, the probability that the adversary distinguishes the two games is
exactly p+q−1p·q . We have p+ q − 1 ≤ 2
k
2
+1 and 2k−1 ≤ p · q and we can therefore
bound the probability of this simulation failing by 2−
k
2
+2. Since the invertibility
of x∗ is important in some later steps, we in fact let H compute a response only
when x∗ is invertible. In the inverter, since x∗ is not public, we instead check
the invertibility of y∗, which is equivalent. For simplicity, we omit discussions
regarding this detail in the rest of this section.
Game 4. In this game, we stop keeping track of the random oracle queries made
by the faulty signature oracle. This is an important step towards being able
to apply Lemma 2, which only discusses the statistical distance between two
distributions on σ′, rather than (ω, σ′). Note that, in Coron and Mandal’s proof,
Lemma 2 is applied before this transition, in a context in which its premises
are not fulfilled. By removing data about random oracle queries, we introduce
observable changes in the game’s behaviour whenever the adversary queries H
with an r that was used previously in a faulty signature query, or whenever the
adversary queries G with an ω that was used previously in a faulty signature
query. We bound the probability of the adversary guessing an ω value using
Lemma 3. Since the view of the adversary does not depend on r values sampled by
the faulty signature oracle (see Fig. 7), the probability of the adversary guessing
an r value used in generating a faulty signature is easily bounded.
Game 5. Our main goal at this stage is to show that faulty signatures are in fact
indistinguishable from uniform randomness and can be simulated without using
the random oracles. Once this is done, we will be able to resume the proof of
security following more standard PSS proofs.
We now use Lemma 2 to completely simulate faulty signature oracle queries.
We focus on the faulty signature oracle, inlining and simplifying H knowing
that c = FSig. On the left, we display the simplified faulty signature oracle from
Game 4 for reference. We make use of elementary properties of the statistical
Figure 7 Game 5: sampling faulty signatures
1: oracle F4(m, ǫ, a)
2: r ← {0, 1}k0
3: σ ← pim(e,N ),y∗,c
([
0..2k−1
))
4: y ← σe mod N
5: r ′ ← {0, 1}ρ \0
6: σ′ ← yd ∗ αp + (a + (y − a
e)) ∗ αq
7: return i2osp(σ′)
1: oracle F5 (m, ǫ, a)
2: r ← {0, 1}k0
3: σ′ ← [0..N )
4: return i2osp(σ′)
Pr[Game4 : win] ≤ Pr[Game5 : win] +
qF · (4e
2
max + 1) · k
2
2ρ−k/2
distance and Lemma 2 to bound the probability of distinguishing Games 5 and 6.
Note that sampling σ in pim(e,N ),y∗,c
([
0..2k−1
))
and applying the public RSA
permutation to obtain y is perfectly equivalent to sampling y in
[
0..2k−1
)
.
Game 6. With the faulty signature oracle simplified away, we can now focus on
simulating the signature oracle. From now on, the c argument to H can no longer
be FSig. More generally, it is impossible for any entry in h or g to be tagged with
FSig. The signature oracle we have defined at this point is not a valid simulator
as it does not run in polynomial time. To ensure that it does, we replace the
sampling operation at line 3 in Fig. 6 (right) with the loop displayed on the left
of Fig. 8 to sample σ. The adversary can distinguish the two games whenever
the loop finishes in a state where y does not start with a 0 bit. At each iteration
Figure 8 Game 6 and inverter: sampling σ in polynomial time
1: while (!0 ≤ y < 2k−1) ∧ i < k0 do
2: σ ← [0..N )
3: y ← f(e,N ),y∗,c(σ)
4: i ← i + 1
1: oracle I(e,N , y∗)
2: (m, s)← AH7 ,G7 ,S7 ,F7 (e,N )
3: σ ← os2ip(s)
4: y ← σe mod N
5: b ||ω || st ← i2osp(y)
6: r || γ ← st ⊕ g [ω]
7: (ω′,Adv, u)← h[m, r ]
8: return σ · u−1
Pr[Game5 : win] ≤ Pr[Game6 : win] + qH +qS
2k0
Pr[Game6 : win] ≤
Pr[OW -RSAI : x = x∗]+ 1
2kh
+ qH
2
k
2
−1
of the loop, the σ sampled is invalid with probability at most 12 . The probability
that all iterations produce an invalid σ is therefore bounded by 1
2k0
, since all
samples are independent. H7 may now be queried qH + qS times, allowing us to
conclude.
Reduction All the oracles are simulated without using any secret data. We now
focus on building an inverter. The adversary can win in two disjoint cases:
– either the H -query made by the verification algorithm is fresh (this occurs
with probability at most 2−kh),
– or the H -query made by the verification algorithm was previously made by
the adversary. If the query was made by the signature oracle, the forgery
cannot be fresh and the adversary cannot win.
In the latter case, the one-way challenge can then be recovered by the inverter
shown on the right of Fig. 8. The key observation is that, in case of a successful
forgery, we have y = σe mod N (line 4) and y = y∗ · ue mod N (by invariant
on h). By definition of y∗ and the morphism and injectivity properties of RSA,
we therefore have σ = x∗ · u. We need to also consider the case where a value
u stored in the h map by the adversary is not invertible, which occurs with
probability at most qH · 2−k/2+1.
The final bound is obtained by transitively using the individual transition
bounds.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proven the secrurity of an infective countermeasure against
the null fault model used in [17] and against more powerfull faults than random
faults in the sense that we let the adversary chose the value of the result. It
would be interesting in the future to take into account faults at each step of
the protected algorithm instead of just the CRT-computation step. Moreover it
would be a great addition to consider more fault models.
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